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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994) 
which grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court." This is a civil case decided by summary judgment in the 
district court. The appeal was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994), and was subsequently transferred to this Court by the supreme 
court on April 5, 1995. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendants Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc., Linsco 
Financial Services, Inc., and Linsco/Private Ledger Corporation 
(collectively referred to herein as "Private Ledger") present the 
following issues for review by this Court: 
1. Did the trial court properly rule that a principal 
cannot cloak its agent with apparent authority in one transaction 
where the agent has acted so far out of the scope of the 
authority granted to him that he has been criminally convicted of 
defrauding his principal in that specific transaction? 
2. Did plaintiffs present sufficient admissible evidence 
to show that a reasonable investor of like experience as 
plaintiffs would and did reasonably believe that Ronald Harry 
("Harry") had apparent authority from Private Ledger to sell 
interests in the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership ("Red 
River") where the undisputed evidence showed: 
(a) Harry signed an independent contractor agreement with 
Private Ledger stating he would only sell securities which had 
been approved for sale by Private Ledger; 
(b) Private Ledger's written policies prohibited the 
practice of "selling away", and Harry executed a separate written 
memorandum agreeing to comply with that policy; 
(c) The Red River investment was never approved for sale by 
Private Ledger; 
(d) The Red River investment by plaintiffs was not made 
through Private Ledger; 
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(e) The Red River investment never appeared on any of 
plaintiffs' Private Ledger account statements; 
(f) Private Ledger's name did not appear on any of the Red 
River offering or pre-offering materials; 
(g) Private Ledger recei ed no commissions or fees on the 
Red River investments; 
(h) Private Ledger had no knowledge that Harry, who had 
been plaintiffs' broker with other brokerage firms for over ten 
years, had solicited and caused plaintiffs to invest in Red River 
and Private Ledger promptly terminated Harry when Private Ledger 
learned that information; and 
(i) Plaintiffs, after learning that Harry had caused their 
money (in bank accounts in Kansas) to be invested in a limited 
partnership (Red River) purportedly without their approval, still 
made no inquiry or complaint to Private Ledger? 
3. Does this Court's prior decision affirming Harry's 
criminal conviction, including his conviction for defrauding 
Private Ledger, preclude plaintiffs' claim that Harry was the 
ostensible agent of Private Ledger in the Red River transaction? 
4. Are plaintiffs' claims barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations where plaintiffs claim they were injured 
by the unauthorized investment in a real estate limited 
partnership and plaintiffs admit in depositions that they were 
aware more than three years before they filed this action that 
Harry had invested their money in a real estate limited 
partnership without their authorization? 
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1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case was decided on summary judgment. The primary 
purpose of summary judgment is to save both the court and the 
litigants the time, trouble and expense of an unnecessary trial 
by allowing the parties to pierce the allegations of the 
pleadings to determine whether there are any genuine issues of 
material fact or whether the controversy can be settled as a 
matter of law. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 
776, 779 (Utah 1984); Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1267-68 
(Utah 1976) . The appellate court determines whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial 
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) . 
Although no deference is given to the trial court's ruling 
on legal issues, an appellate court "may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even 
if it is one not relied on below." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (affirming summary judgment on 
alternative ground after finding trial court erred in granting on 
other ground). Consequently, this Court may, and should, affirm 
summary judgment based on either or both of the grounds raised by 
Private Ledger in its motion for summary judgment. 
2. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The original Complaint by Frank Brgoch ("Brgoch") and 
Seymour Isaacs ("Isaacs") was filed on March 17, 1992 naming 
Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry") and Private Ledger, a national 
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securities broker-dealer, as defendants. [R. 2-8] Plaintiffs' 
claims all arise from an investment each made in May 1988 in Red 
River, an Arizona real estate limited partnership. Despite their 
claims that the Red River investments were unauthorized and based 
on mistake, plaintiffs never sued Red River or either of its 
general partners. Harry was an independent contractor pursuant 
to a written Registered Representative Agreement with Private 
Ledger. [R. 565, 523] 
On December 31, 1992, plaintiffs filed a First Amended 
Complaint alleging seven causes of action. [R. 288-302] Private 
Ledger was named as a defendant in only the second cause of 
action for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the fourth cause of 
action for alleged negligence, and the sixth cause of action for 
alleged securities violations under the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act. 
On March 30, 1994, Private Ledger moved for summary judgment 
[R. 405-407] on two grounds: (1) Private Ledger was not liable 
for Harry's actions because Harry acted outside the control and 
scope of authority granted to him by Private Ledger for the sale 
of approved securities; and (2) plaintiffs' claims were barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations because they were 
admittedly aware in July of 1988, more than three years before 
they filed this action, that Harry violated their express 
agreement regarding investments. On May 17, 1994, the trial 
court granted Private Ledger's motion on the first ground only, 
but denied it as to the second ground. [R. 666, 820-822] 
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On June 17, 1994, plaintiffs filed a motion and memorandum 
for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for a new trial [R. 
682-701] based on the same grounds raised in this appeal. The 
trial court properly denied that motion on November 21, 1994. 
[R. 823-824] Plaintiffs-appellants now bring this appeal. As 
demonstrated below, the trial court's summary judgment was proper 
and must be affirmed, on both grounds raised by Private Ledger. 
3, STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Harry acted as stockbroker for Brgoch and Isaacs at various 
brokerage firms from 1977 through 1989. [R. 493-498, 499-504] 
Appellants were experienced investors, who began speculating on 
the stock market in 1972 and who had at least two other brokers 
who they used regularly for speculative investments. [R. 63 6-
640; Supplemental Appellate Record, Deposition of Kenneth Done, 
pp. 6-7]x For example, Brgoch invested approximately $40,000 in 
speculative penny stocks over a ten year period. [R. 636-640] 
This undisputed evidence is in sharp contrast to appellants' 
claim in their Brief that they were ,fnot sophisticated or 
knowledgeable investors by any definition." [See Appellants' 
Brief, p. 6.] The undisputed evidence shows otherwise. 
xOn September 7, 1995, Private Ledger filed a motion with this 
Court to supplement the official appellate record. The exact page 
cites in the official record for these supplemental pages will be 
provided to the Court once the motion is granted and the official 
pagination for the supplemental pages has been determined. When 
referring to portions of the Supplemental Appellate Record, this 
Brief will use the page number found in the original document. 
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Following their respective retirements as airline pilots in 
1984, Brgoch and Isaacs contend that they specifically and 
continually instructed Harry (years before he had any affiliation 
with Private Ledger) that they wanted no more limited partnership 
investments, no investments which were subject to continuing 
contributions, and no long-term investments inasmuch as they were 
both living off their retirement accounts and long-term 
investments were of no use to them given their life expectancy. 
[R. 493-504] 
Harry became a licensed independent contractor registered 
representative of Private Ledger in late December of 1987, and 
executed his Registered Representative Agreement on January 11, 
1988. [R. 523-530] Before joining Private Ledger, Harry was 
with Prudential Bache Securities in Salt Lake City, Utah, where 
plaintiffs were his clients. In fact, Harry joined Private 
Ledger shortly after his former colleague at Prudential Bache, 
Cregg Cannon ("Cannon"), became a licensed independent contractor 
registered representative of Private Ledger on November 25, 1987. 
[R. 564-566, 519] 
On or about May 9, 1988, Harry caused $30,600 of Brgoch's 
funds and $31,000 of Isaacs' funds to be invested in Red River. 
[R. 461-465] At the time of those investments, Harry had been 
plaintiffs' stockbroker for over ten years, but he had been 
affiliated with Private Ledger for less than five months. It is 
undisputed, as the trial court noted, that plaintiffs' long-term 
relationship was with Harry, not Private Ledger. 
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To facilitate the later making of these Red River 
investments, Harry had caused to be transferred by wire transfer 
the necessary funds from plaintiffs' respective accounts at 
Private Ledger to the First National Bank of Onaga, Kansas. [R. 
463-465] Both plaintiffs admit that their Private Ledger 
statements in May or June of 1988 showed the transfer of funds 
from their accounts to the Kansas bank in accounts in their 
names. [R. 600 (H 3), 605 (11 3)] It is undisputed that, for 
purposes of Private Ledger's records, no mention was ever made of 
Red River, and the transfer of plaintiffs' funds to bank accounts 
in Kansas was entirely proper. It was after the plaintiffs' 
funds were in their individual accounts in the Kansas bank that 
the Red River investments were made. Understandably, Private 
Ledger could have no knowledge of, or involvement in, that 
investment. 
Brgoch and Isaacs contend that Harry did not seek or obtain 
their prior approval to make the investments in Red River and 
that the investments in Red River were, in fact, contrary to 
their prior specific instructions to Harry concerning the types 
of investments they wanted to make following their retirements. 
[R. 436, 441-446, 449-455, 493-504] They did not, and could not, 
contend that Private Ledger had any knowledge of the Red River 
investments prior to or at the time those investments were made. 
In or about July, 1988, approximately two months after the 
Red River investments were made, Brgoch and Isaacs each received 
a statement dated June 30, 1988 from the First National Bank of 
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Onaga stating that funds had then been transferred to First 
National Bank of Onaga and that these funds had then been used to 
purchase units in Red River. [R. 436, 438, 449-453, 463-465] 
The Kansas bank statements expressly informed plaintiffs that 
their funds had been invested in a limited partnership. [R. 463-
465] Both Brgoch and Isaacs admit receiving and reviewing their 
statement from the bank in July 1988. [R. 436, 438, 449-453, 
463-465, 600 (% 4), 605 (H 4)] 
Following receipt of the June 30, 1988 statement from First 
National Bank of Onaga, Brgoch and Isaacs went to see Harry in 
July, 1988 to discuss the meaning of the statement and the 
investment in Red River. [R. 600, 605] At the time of the July, 
1988 meeting with Harry, almost four years before filing this 
action, Brgoch and Isaacs knew that Harry had violated their 
alleged express instructions by causing their funds to be 
invested in a long-term real estate limited partnership such as 
Red River and both were extremely upset that Harry had done so. 
Brgoch and Isaacs implored Harry to "get them out" of the 
investment in Red River. [R. 436, 438-439, 441-442, 443-446, 
449-455] 
At the meeting and afterwards, neither Brgoch nor Isaacs 
made any effort to investigate the details of their new 
investment. Plaintiffs dealt only with Harry, and made no 
attempt to contact anyone at Private Ledger. [Supplemental 
Appellate Record, Brgoch Depo., p. 127:9-12; Supplemental 
Appellate Record, Isaacs Depo., p. 113:17-21.] Plaintiffs' 
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failure to make any attempt to contact or complain to anyone at 
Private Ledger after learning of Harry's conduct in July 1988 
further confirms their awareness that Private Ledger had no 
involvement whatsoever with Red River, or Harry's activities 
involving Red River. 
Brgoch admits that he received a copy of the Red River pre-
offering summary at the time of the July, 1988 meeting with 
Harry, which clearly sets forth the obligation for substantial 
annual contributions to the partnership, but claims not have read 
it. [R. 437, 440, 445] Isaacs, apparently, made no attempt to 
ever read such materials. [R. 456-459] 
Approximately eight months later, in a letter dated 
March 15, 1989, Red River informed Brgoch and Isaacs that their 
obligation to pay the first annual contribution of over $17,000 
was then due and payable. Those annual obligations were 
disclosed in the Red River offering materials. Brgoch and Isaacs 
admit that they received these letters "on or about March 20, 
1989." [R. 437, 440, 445, 456-459] Brgoch and Isaacs did not 
file their original Complaint until March 17, 1992. [R. 2-8] 
Private Ledger first learned of Cannon's involvement with 
Red River when Private Ledger received a letter from Scott R. 
Frost of the State of Utah, Department of Business Regulations, 
Securities Division, dated February 3, 1989. [R. 511, 567] 
Thereafter, Private Ledger promptly investigated the matter and 
terminated its relationship with Cannon on March 8, 1989. [R. 
512-513, 567-568] Private Ledger was subsequently informed that 
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Red River was an Arizona limited partnership and that the general 
partners were Cannon and Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr. [R. 567] 
Private Ledger did not become aware of Harry's involvement 
with Red River until November 7, 1989. [R. 568] Thereafter, 
Private Ledger promptly terminated its relationship with Harry on 
November 15, 1989. [R. 568] 
Red River was never approved for sale by Private Ledger. 
[R. 567] Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were not made 
through Private Ledger and the Red River investments never 
appeared on any Private Ledger statements. [R. 567-568] Private 
Ledger received no commissions or fees on the Red River 
transactions. [R. 568] Private Ledger had no prior knowledge 
that Harry had solicited plaintiffs to invest in Red River. [R. 
568] 
At the time Harry became a licensed independent contractor 
registered representative of Private Ledger, he signed a written 
agreement [R. 523, 564-565], which specifically provided that he 
would only sell securities which had been approved by Private 
Ledger for sale. [R. 525 (H 3A), 564-565] Cannon had also done 
so. [R. 565, 519-522] In addition, Harry signed a separate 
memorandum acknowledging Private Ledger's strict prohibition [and 
the prohibition by the National Association of Securities Dealers 
("NASD")] against the solicitation and sale of private securities 
transactions which were not approved by Private Ledger, referred 
to as "selling away." [R. 566-567, 508-510] Cannon had also 
executed a similar document. [R. 567-568, 505-507] 
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In fact, following their termination by Private Ledger, 
Cannon pled guilty and Harry was later convicted following trial 
of four counts, including committing criminal fraud on Private 
Ledger in connection with his unauthorized solicitation and sale 
of investments in Red River. [R. 569] Plaintiffs did not 
dispute these facts in the trial court, and never took a single 
deposition to refute or contest the matters presented to the 
trial court. 
Approximately one month before the hearing on Private 
Ledger's summary judgment motion, Harry's conviction was affirmed 
by this Court, State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1994). 
Despite Harry having been criminally convicted of defrauding 
Private Ledger in this transaction, plaintiffs contend here that 
Private Ledger should be liable in this civil action for his 
criminal acts. 
4. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This action concerns plaintiffs' investment in May 1988, in 
the Red River real estate limited partnership. At the time 
plaintiffs made this investment, Harry was a licensed independent 
contractor registered representative of Private Ledger. Harry 
had only been a registered representative of Private Ledger since 
December of 1987 or January 1988. Harry had, however, previously 
acted as stockbroker for Brgoch and Isaacs at various other 
brokerage houses beginning in 1977 and continuing for over a 
decade. It is undisputed that plaintiffs' long time relationship 
was solely with Harry, not Private Ledger. 
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Plaintiffs contend that Harry invested their funds in Red 
River without their knowledge or approval and, in fact, that such 
investment was in direct violation of their specific instructions 
to Harry not to invest any of their retirement funds in limited 
partnerships such as Red River. 
It is clear, however, that Harry's investment of plaintiffs' 
funds in Red River was a such a highly irregular transaction that 
plaintiffs could not reasonably have believed, nor did they 
believe, that Harry had the actual or apparent authority from 
Private Ledger to sell that investment. Private Ledger had 
transferred money from plaintiffs' accounts to the Kansas bank 
accounts in plaintiffs' names. What plaintiffs then did with 
these funds thereafter was beyond Private Ledger's knowledge or 
control. There was absolutely no actual or apparent involvement 
of Private Ledger in plaintiffs' Red River investments. 
Therefore, Private Ledger, which never did anything to cloak 
Harry with authority to conduct the Red River transaction, has no 
liability as a matter of law for the allegedly wrongful conduct 
of Harry. Numerous reported cases presented to the trial court, 
and one decided subsequent to the granting of summary judgment, 
clearly so hold. 
It is also clear from plaintiffs' own deposition testimony 
and other evidence in this case that plaintiffs were aware in 
July 1988, at the latest, that Harry had invested their money 
from the Kansas bank accounts without authorization in a real 
estate limited partnership -- the exact conduct they complain of 
PKNS\0063995.WP 1 2 
in this action. Therefore, the applicable two-year and three-
year statutes of limitation had expired by the time plaintiffs 
filed their original Complaint on March 17, 1992. Consequently, 
plaintiffs' claims are all time-barred, and summary judgment is 
also proper on that ground. 
5. ARGUMENT 
A. Private Ledger Is Not Liable For Harrys Actions 
Because Plaintiffs Could Not Have Reasonably Believed 
That Harry Had Private Ledger's Authority To Sell 
Interests In Red River. 
(1) Plaintiffs Were Keenly Aware From The Beginning 
That The Transaction Was Highly Irregular And Not 
A Private Ledger Transaction. 
Plaintiffs argue that the "most relevant case" for this 
appeal is Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). (See Appellants' Brief, p. 11.) Horrocks, which did 
not involve the sale of securities, nor a brokerage firm 
relationship, merely states that "a principal is bound by the 
acts of an agent clothed with apparent authority." 892 P.2d at 
15. The stated reason for this is that "[w]here the loss is to 
be suffered through the misconduct of an agent, it should be 
borne by those who put it in his power to do the wrong." 
Horrocks, 892 P.2d at 16 (quoting County of Macon v. Shores, 97 
U.S. 272, 279 (1877)). But plaintiffs fail to explain what it 
means for a principal to cloak his agent with apparent authority, 
or why this Court found, in contrast to the undisputed facts 
here, that the principal in Horrocks had done so. Other reported 
cases involving securities broker-dealers resolve this very issue 
adversely to appellants as a matter of law. 
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Moreover, it was plaintiffs, not Private Ledger, who put 
Harry in the position to invest their funds from a Kansas bank 
account in Red River. Indeed, this Court noted in State v. 
Harry. supra, that: 
Brgoch and Isaacs, two friends who are 
retired airline pilots, had both used Harry 
as their broker since the 1970s. Both men 
crave Harry discretionary trading authority. 
[873 P.2d at 1151 (emphasis added)] 
"Apparent authority arises from the principal's 
manifestation of such authority to the party with whom the agent 
contracts." Bates v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 42 F.3d 79, 82 
(1st Cir. 1994) . Private Ledger communicated no such 
manifestation of authority to plaintiffs with respect to Harry's 
authority regarding Red River. A third person's belief in an 
agent's authority to act on behalf of the principal, however, 
must be reasonable, meaning, "from the point of view of the third 
person, the transaction seems regular on its face and the agent 
appears to be acting in the ordinary course of the business 
confided to him." Id. at 82-83, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 261 (1958) (emphasis added). 
Bates, which was decided after the trial court granted 
summary judgment in this case, affirmed a summary judgment in 
favor of the brokerage firm where the broker had misappropriated 
the investor's funds. Like here, the investor in Bates sued 
Shearson claiming the brokerage firm was liable for the 
employee7 s dishonesty. In rejecting the investor's argument that 
Shearson should be held liable under a theory of apparent 
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authority and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261, the First Circuit 
analyzed facts far more favorable to the investor than those 
here, and noted that the broker's activities were directly 
contrary to Shearson's clear policies. Significantly, the Court 
in Bates noted that the investor's checks were not made out to 
Shearson, just as plaintiffs had no checks or monies payable to 
Private Ledger for their Red River investments. Likewise, no 
monies were paid out of plaintiffs' Private Ledger accounts 
directly to Red River. Here it is undisputed that plaintiffs' 
funds were transferred from Private Ledger to a Kansas bank in 
plaintiffs' names, and the Red River investments were then made 
from the Kansas bank accounts.2 
In Horrocks, by contrast, the transaction with the agent was 
regular on its face and the plaintiff's belief in the agent's 
apparent authority, therefore, was reasonable. In that case, the 
agent/salesman of a dairy equipment company entered into a 
contract with the plaintiff to purchase some equipment from the 
principal, using the principal's documentation. Horrocks, 892 
P.2d at 14-15. The plaintiff gave the agent a down payment, 
which the principal cashed, and secured the balance of the 
purchase price with a milk assignment. Id. at 15. The principal 
then delivered some of the equipment to the plaintiff, but the 
2
 As noted above, plaintiffs made no attempt to sue Red River 
or its general partners, or to seek rescission for an investment 
allegedly made through mistake or misrepresentation. Likewise, 
plaintiffs did not sue the Kansas bank or contend that the Kansas 
bank had acted improperly in transferring funds from their accounts 
in that bank to Red River. 
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agent stole the rest, after tiricking the plaintiff into signing a 
form provided by the principal acknowledging receipt of all the 
equipment. Id. Based on these facts, this Court in Horrocks 
found "[t]he record replete with facts sufficient to clothe [the 
agent] with apparent authority." 8 92 P.2d at 16. 
In contrast to Horrocks, plaintiffs could present no 
admissible evidence to the trial court to show that they could 
have reasonably believed that the Red River investment was a 
regular securities offering being sold through Private Ledger, 
which Harry had authority to make for Private Ledger. Plaintiffs 
executed no Private Ledger forms and made no payments to Private 
Ledger regarding Red River. Appellants' investments in Red River 
were not made through Private Ledger and the Red River 
investments never appeared on any Private Ledger account 
statements. 
The undisputed evidence does not indicate that plaintiffs 
actually believed, or reasonably could have believed, that it was 
a regular transaction with Private Ledger. Plaintiffs were 
acutely aware as soon as they received the statements from the 
Bank of Onaga (not a Private Ledger account statement), expressly 
informing them that their funds had been invested in a limited 
partnership, that Harry had violated their express instructions. 
They were extremely upset with Harry and allegedly demanded an 
explanation from Harry (not Private Ledger) of why their money 
had been transferred out of their accounts, without their 
approval, and why it had been invested in a real estate limited 
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partnership. Isaacs did not even believe an investment in Red 
River had been made because he did not receive the regular 
paperwork from Private Ledger that accompanied a normal 
transaction. [R. 449] 
In addition, it is undisputed that Red River was never 
approved for sale by Private Ledger, and that Harry violated the 
agreement he signed (and NASD regulations) acknowledging the 
prohibition against "selling away," i.e., the solicitation and 
sale of private securities transactions which were not approved 
by Private Ledger. Finally, Private Ledger received no 
commissions or fees on the Red River transactions and Private 
Ledger had no prior knowledge that Harry had solicited customers, 
including plaintiffs, to invest in Red River. 
Because plaintiffs were immediately aware that this 
transaction was not "regular on its face," they could not have 
reasonably believed, nor did they, that Harry had apparent 
authority to engage in the Red River transactions on behalf of 
Private Ledger, particularly when Harry's conduct resulted in him 
being convicted of criminally defrauding Private Ledger in this 
matter. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that 
Private Ledger is not liable for Harry's actions with respect to 
plaintiffs. 
(2) The Trial Court Properly Ruled That Where An 
Agent's Conduct That Is So Highly Irregular That 
It Is Criminally Fraudulent, Such Conduct Cannot 
Bind The Principal. 
The grounds asserted in Private Ledger's Motion for Summary 
Judgment relied upon by the trial court in granting the motion do 
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not contradict the general principles of agency law discussed 
above. Rather, Private Ledger's argument that it could not be 
liable for Harry's actions with respect to Red River was based 
upon recent securities cases that expressly reflect the general 
agency principle that a person's belief in the apparent authority 
of the agent must be reasonable, and must be based on conduct of 
the principal. These cases consistently hold that a securities 
broker-dealer has no liability as a matter of law for the actions 
of registered representatives that are clearly outside the 
broker/dealer's control. 
The leading case in this area is Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d 
1338 (9th Cir. 1994). In Hauser, two registered representatives 
at Rauscher, Pierce (a broker/dealer), formed a partnership 
called New Technologies in Energy ("NTE"). 14 F.3d at 1340. The 
two registered representatives solicited some of their Rauscher, 
Pierce customers to purchase interests in NTE. Id. The two 
registered representatives were themselves the general partners 
of NTE and no one at Rauscher, Pierce knew that the registered 
representatives were selling interests in NTE to their customers. 
Id. 
The NTE investment did not pass through Rauscher, Pierce, 
the NTE transactions were not listed on the customers' Rauscher, 
Pierce statements, and the customers never received anything on 
Rauscher, Pierce stationery encouraging them to invest. Id. 
Nevertheless, the customers testified that they "presumed" that 
Rauscher, Pierce either was "involved" or was aware that the 
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registered representatives were promoting NTE to Rauscher, Pierce 
customers. Id. And the customers frequently did discuss NTE at 
the stockbrokers' Rauscher, Pierce offices. Id. The trial court 
granted Rauscher, Pierce's motion for summary judgment on the 
ground that this private securities transaction was outside 
Rauscher, Pierce's control. Id. 
The customers based their action against Rauscher, Pierce on 
three separate theories: that Rauscher, Pierce was a "controlling 
person" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that Rauscher, 
Pierce was an "aider and abettor" of alleged Rule 10b-5 
violations, and that Rauscher, Pierce was vicariously liable 
under the state law doctrine of respondeat superior for the 
actions of the registered representatives. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit unanimously rejected these arguments and 
affirmed the summary judgment. With respect to theories of 
control person =md aider/abettor liability under federal 
securities law, the court found that the investment 
and any related transactions fall outside of the scope 
of that activity that Rauscher, Pierce, as a broker, is 
statutorily required to supervise. 
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Id. at 1342.3 In addition, the Hauser court held that the 
customers "were not reasonably relying upon the stockbrokers as 
registered representatives of Rauscher, Pierce." Id. at 1342-43 
(emphasis added). The court based these conclusions upon the 
following facts: 
[T]his litigation does not involve the type of 
securities transactions that could only be performed 
through [the registered representative's] association 
with a broker-dealer. The dispute here centers on an 
investment promoted as an interest in a small 
enterprise that was unrelated to any of the securities 
offered by Rauscher/Pierce through its registered 
agents. [The registered representatives] were not 
acting in their capacity as "registered agents" of 
Rauscher/Pierce when they approached the plaintiffs 
with this supposed investment opportunity. Rather, the 
NTE investment scheme proposed by [the registered 
representatives] was their own personal project, in 
which they held personal interests. On the other hand, 
Rauscher/Pierce has never had an interest in the 
venture. There has been no evidence offered to suggest 
that Rauscher/Pierce even had any meaningful knowledge 
of the scheme or that it was the type of transaction 
that Rauscher/Pierce dealt with or had an interest in 
at all as a brokerage house. In fact, it was not. 
Rather, the NTE "deal" was a separate arrangement 
entered into by the co-defendants as private 
individuals, not as "registered agents" of 
Rauscher/Pierce . . . . There is no evidence that [the 
registered representatives] used their "access to the 
trading markets" through Rauscher/Pierce to promote the 
NTE venture. Nor is there a suggestion that [the 
registered representatives] could not have legally 
promoted this scheme without being registered with the 
SEC or with a broker-dealer. [Id. at 1341-42.] 
3
 The court also noted that the customers failed to satisfy 
the requirement under then-existing federal securities law that an 
aider/abettor act with scienter. Id. at 1343. The court noted 
that the "concept [of aider and abettor liability] cannot be 
applied through a legal fiction to an entity [such as 
Rauscher/Pierce] which does not know of the wrong or its role if 
any in furthering it." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently 
eliminated all "aider and abettor" liability under the federal 
securities laws in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 
... U.S. ..., 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994). 
PKNS\0063995.WP 20 
With respect to liability under the state law doctrine of 
respondeat superior, the court ruled that: 
The theory appears to be that, since the stockbrokers 
were Rauscher/Pierce employees, customers would 
reasonably rely on Rauscher/Pierce . . . . 
Nevertheless, the District Court correctly concluded 
the record left room for no genuine issue of fact, 
because it established that the customers could not 
reasonably have believed that Rauscher/Pierce had 
anything to do with the NTE promotion. fid, at 1343 
(emphasis added).] 
Thus, the Hauser court harmonized control person liability under 
federal securities law with a principal's respondeat superior 
liability under agency law; where an agent/stockbroker acts so 
far out of the principal/broker-dealer's control that no customer 
could reasonably rely on his authority to engage in the 
transaction, as a matter of law the principal/broker-dealer 
cannot be held liable. The same rule of law controls here. 
As in Hauser, plaintiffs could not have reasonably believed 
that the Red River investment was a regular Private Ledger 
transaction that Private Ledger had specifically authorized Harry 
to make on its behalf. Nor does the undisputed evidence indicate 
that plaintiffs reasonably believed it was a regular Private 
Ledger transaction. Plaintiffs were acutely aware, as soon as 
they received the statements from the Bank of Onaga expressly 
informing them that their funds in the Kansas bank had been 
invested in a limited partnership, that Harry had violated their 
express instructions. The investments in Red River were not made 
through Private Ledger and the Red River investments never 
appeared on any Private Ledger statements. And like the brokers 
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in Hauser, Harry told investors that he and his father had 
invested their own money in Red River. See State v. Harry, 
supra, 873 P.2d at 1151. 
In addition, Red River was never approved for sale by 
Private Ledger. Harry violated the agreement he signed 
acknowledging the prohibition against the solicitation and sale 
of private securities transactions which were not approved by 
Private Ledger.4 
Appellants argue, with no admissible evidence, that Private 
Ledger purportedly "tolerated" the practice of "selling away" 
despite official policy prohibiting such conduct. The undisputed 
evidence, however, indicates that Private Ledger promptly 
terminated its relationship with both Harry and another 
registered representative, Cannon, as soon as it became aware 
each had sold the Red River investment. [R. 567-568] Moreover, 
plaintiffs produced no evidence from Harry to support that 
unfounded claim. 
4
 This Court, in reviewing the record in State v. Harry, 
supra, noted: 
According to Private Ledger's rules, agents were not 
permitted to sell any securities that were not approved 
by Private Ledger unless the agent received prior written 
permission. An agent's sale of an unapproved security is 
referred to as "selling away." Selling away is 
prohibited under the National Association of Securities 
Dealers' Rules because it entails sale of a security that 
has, in most cases, not been reviewed by the broker-
dealer to ensure the offering is legitimate and is 
something that the broker-dealer wishes to sponsor for 
sale. Selling away also deprives the broker-dealer of 
its share of commissions on a securities sale. [873 P. 2d 
at 1152.] 
PKNS\0063995 WP 22 
The only purported "evidence" plaintiffs presented to 
support this allegation is the affidavit of Cannon [R. 617-619], 
who pleaded guilty to committing criminal securities fraud for 
his role in "selling away" activities involving Red River. 
Cannon's affidavit consisted of nothing more than hearsay and 
unfounded opinions, and Private Ledger filed written evidentiary 
objections to that affidavit, including citations to clear Utah 
authorities rendering the affidavit inadmissible. [R. 644-648] 
Likewise, the speciousness of the argument that Private 
Ledger purportedly "tolerated" Harry's practice of "selling away" 
is clearly refuted by this Court's decision in affirming Harry's 
conviction of defrauding Private Ledger in connection with the 
Red River transactions. As indicated in Harry's criminal appeal, 
he vigorously contested, both at the trial court and on appeal, 
his conviction for defrauding Private Ledger. If, as plaintiffs 
would now suggest to this Court, Private Ledger had in any way 
"tolerated" or condoned the practice of selling away, that would 
have been a complete defense to the criminal charge against Harry 
for defrauding Private Ledger by engaging in "selling away" 
activities. Plaintiffs cannot cite a single reference in the 
record in the trial court, or in the decision by this Court in 
State v. Harry, supra, wherein Harry ever claimed that his 
"selling away" activities were in any way tolerated by Private 
Ledger. 
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Again, this Court's decision in State v. Harry demonstrates 
the criminal conduct of Harry in clearly concealing his 
activities involving Red River from Private Ledger: 
According to trial testimony, Harry concealed the sale 
of Red River units from Private Ledger and did not 
receive permission to sell the units. Moreover, in a 
Private Ledger compliance questionnaire completed by 
Harry approximately five months after selling the Red 
River units, Harry denied that he had sold any 
securities or received a commission on sold away 
investments. Also, while employed at Private Ledger, 
Harry submitted weekly sales forms to Private Ledger 
indicating securities sold each week. Harry never 
included the sale of Red River units on any of the 
forms. [873 P.2d at 1152.] 
This Court affirmed Harry's conviction of criminally 
defrauding Private Ledger, i.e., upheld the jury's verdict that 
such criminal conduct had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Plaintiffs, without any admissible evidentiary support 
whatsoever, now suggest that this same Court should conclude, in 
a civil case with a lesser burden of proof, that Harry's selling 
away activities were condoned or "tolerated" by Private Ledger. 
Such a ruling would be wholly inconsistent with Harry's 
conviction. Appellants' Brief [p. 10] notes that the trial 
court, in granting summary judgment, observed: 
The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of 
defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion in 
that one cannot be an agent of the principal at the 
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally 
fraudulent. They are mutually exclusive actions and 
terms. [R. 847-848] 
The trial court was absolutely correct, and acted consistent with 
this Court's decision in affirming Harry's conviction. If Harry 
could not produce any evidence to raise even a reasonable doubt 
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that he had not defrauded Private Ledger, and certainly 
tolerating or condoning his "selling away" activities, would have 
given rise to such a defense, plaintiffs could not sustain such a 
burden in the civil action. Moreover, it is undisputed that 
plaintiffs did not take a single deposition of any Private Ledger 
employee and did nothing to rebut the Boynton Affidavit. [R. 
564-569] Finally, Private Ledger received no commissions or fees 
on the Red River transactions and Private Ledger had no prior 
knowledge that Harry had solicited customers, including 
plaintiffs, to invest in Red River. [Id.]5 
Plaintiffs argue in their brief that this Court's decision 
affirming Harry's criminal conviction is contrary to the summary 
judgment in the civil action. As demonstrated herein, just the 
opposite is true. Appellants argue in their Brief [p.19] that 
the statement in this Court's decision in State v. Harry, 873 
P.2d at 1157, that Harry's action exposed Private Ledger to 
"potential lawsuits from the disgruntled investors" somehow 
5
 Plaintiffs attempt, unsuccessfully, to distinguish Hauser 
by the fact that the stockbrokers in that case told their customers 
the investment was not with Rauscher, Pierce. But plaintiffs 
cannot deny that they knew immediately the Red River investment was 
irregular and not a regular Private Ledger transaction. In fact, 
Isaacs admits that Harry never told them Private Ledger was 
involved with Red River: 
Q. Did Ron Harry ever tell you that Private Ledger had 
approved of the solicitation and sale of the 
investments in Red River Mountain? 
A. No, never said that. 
[Supplemental Appellate Record, Isaacs Depo., p. 120 (emphasis 
added).] 
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suggests that Private Ledger should have civil liability for such 
criminal conduct by Harry. On the contrary, this Court correctly 
pointed out in State v. Harry that one of the elements of damage 
or harm to Private Ledger which resulted in Harry's criminal 
conviction was the expense of being forced to defend "lawsuits 
from the disgruntled investors" such as these plaintiffs. Even 
though Private Ledger has prevailed as a matter of law, Harry's 
criminal conduct has exposed Private Ledger to considerable 
expense in defending itself, just as this Court predicted in 
State v. Harry. 
Likewise, plaintiffs argue in their brief [p.19] that "a 
brokerage house such as Private Ledger is a principal which 
courts have held to a higher standard of accountability." 
However, this Court quoted in State v. Harry the written 
agreements which Harry signed, Private Ledger's compliance 
directives and questionnaires and other policies and procedures 
of Private Ledger designed to fulfill any higher standard of 
accountability and to prevent the type of conduct engaged in by 
Harry. More significantly, plaintiffs did not present to the 
trial court a single piece of admissible evidence from any expert 
in the securities industry suggesting that Private Ledger had 
failed to comply with the industry standards. In short, Private 
Ledger's evidence on this issue was completely uncontested and 
unrebutted. 
In addition to Bates, supra, and Hauser [R. 531-534], three 
other recent securities cases (each cited and provided to the 
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trial court [R. 535-565]) analyze the apparent authority of a 
registered representative to sell unauthorized securities and 
parallel the circumstances in the present case. In gohn v. 
QPtik. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) fl 97,435 (CD. Cal. 1993) [R. 535-
541], the court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
brokerage firm, holding that the plaintiff had failed to 
establish that the registered representative acted either with 
actual or apparent authority, where the plaintiff had made 
investments as a result of allegedly fraudulently solicitations 
by a registered representative. The court noted that the 
investor did not make her payments to the brokerage firm or 
receive any receipts or account statements with respect to the 
subject investments from the brokerage firm. That is the 
undisputed evidence here. 
Similarly, in Jones v. Phoenix Aviation Inc., 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2259 (CD. Cal. February 11, 1993) [R. 542-547], the 
investors sued the broker-dealer under a respondeat superior 
theory for the alleged fraudulent acts of one of its account 
executives. The court held that the broker-dealer was not liable 
even though the account executive had used the broker-dealer's 
facilities to coordinate the transactions. The court in Jones 
noted that the broker-dealer's "compliance manual" specifically 
prohibited account executives from being involved in business 
activities outside of the firm. [p. 4] The court also noted 
that the transactions in question were not an offering of the 
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broker-dealer and that the investors did not receive confirming 
documents on the subject investments from the broker-dealer. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the 
broker dealer was not liable for the improper activities of the 
registered representative because such acts were outside of the 
scope of his apparent authority. FSC Securities Corp. v. 
McCormack, 630 So. 2d 979 (1994). [R. 548-565] The court noted 
that there was no evidence that the broker-dealer knew of the 
unauthorized activity, and the evidence showed that the investor 
was given a receipt stating that the funds were received on 
behalf of another company and not on behalf of the broker-dealer. 
As in Hauser, Baker, and the other securities cases, 
appellants could not, and did not, reasonably believe that the 
Red River investment was a regular Private Ledger transaction in 
which Harry had authority from Private Ledger to act on its 
behalf. Consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and, as a matter of law, Private Ledger is not liable for the 
conduct of Harry of which plaintiffs complain. 
B. Plaintiffs' Claims Against Private Ledger Are Barred By 
The Applicable Statutes Of Limitations Because 
Plaintiffs Knew in July of 1988 That Harry Had Invested 
Their Funds In A Real Estate Limited Partnership 
Contrary To Plaintiffa' Express Instructions, 
As noted above, Private Ledger also moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the statutes of limitations barred 
plaintiffs' claims. The trial court denied that portion of the 
motion, finding that factual questions exist. Inasmuch as the 
Utah cases cited above specifically authorize the upholding of 
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summary judgment on any ground presented to the trial court, the 
following discussion demonstrates that summary judgment was 
proper on both grounds raised by Private Ledger in its motion. 
(1) Plaintiffs' Second Cause Of Action For Breach Of 
Fiduciary Duty And Fourth Cause Of Action For 
Negligence Are Time Barred• 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26 provides that the 
following actions must be brought within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to 
real property; . . . 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring 
personal property, including actions for specific 
recovery thereof; . . . 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action in such case 
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes 
of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture 
under the laws of this state, except where in special 
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the 
statutes of this state. (Emphasis added.) 
The applicable statute of limitations for common law fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty is three years. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-12-26(3) (1993). In addition, plaintiffs' fourth cause of 
action for negligence is also subject to the three year statute 
of limitations set forth in Section 78-12-26. Holm v. B&M 
Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951, 951-53 (Utah 1983). 
In this action, plaintiffs seek to recover their funds 
invested in Red River. Therefore, it is clear that, regardless 
of whether plaintiffs frame their theory of liability as fraud, 
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breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence, the three-year statute 
of limitations in Section 78-12-26 applies. 
Importantly, this three-year statute of limitations begins 
to run "from the time the fraud was actually known or could have 
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence." 
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993); see also 
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 247 (1916). The Supreme Court 
further explained in Baldwin that: 
The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A 
party who has opportunity of knowing the facts 
constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and 
afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by 
reason of his own laches and negligence. 
850 P.2d at 1196 (quoting Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d 
222 (1935)) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also held in 
Baldwin that a plaintiff need: 
not have learned every detail of the alleged fraud or 
even discovered that actual fraud did in fact 
occur . . . . [I]t is not necessary for a claimant to 
know every fact about his fraud claim before the 
statute begins to run. [Id. at 1197.] 
In this action, the statute of limitations began to run, at 
the latest, in July 1988. As stated above, plaintiffs contend 
that, following their retirement in 1984, they specifically and 
continually instructed Harry not to invest their retirement funds 
in real estate limited partnerships, including those that 
required substantial annual contributions, such as Red River. It 
is undisputed that both Brgoch and Isaacs received the statement 
from First National Bank of Onaga dated June 30, 1988 [R. 599-
600, 604-605] which expressly informed them that their funds had 
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been invested in a limited partnership. In the meeting with 
Harry in July 1988, plaintiffs became aware that Harry had 
invested their funds in a real estate limited partnership 
allegedly in direct violation of their express instructions to 
him. Thus, plaintiffs were aware of the exact conduct they 
complain of in this action -- Harry's unauthorized investment in 
a real estate limited partnership --in July of 1988 at the 
latest. 
That plaintiffs were well aware that Harry had done 
something suspiciously wrong is indisputably evidenced by their 
reaction to receiving the Kansas bank statement: plaintiffs 
testified that they were extremely upset with Harry for having 
invested their funds in a limited partnership and implored Harry 
at the July 1988 meeting to "get them out" of the investment in 
Red River. In fact, Brgoch testified at his deposition that he 
was "panicked" and felt Harry had engaged in wrongful conduct as 
soon as he received the statement from First National Bank of 
Onaga and met with Harry in July, 1988 concerning the Red River 
investment. Brgoch testified at his deposition as follows: 
R. 441 Q. Before you had contact from the Attorney 
General's Office [concerning Harry's criminal 
investigation], did you feel that Ron Harry 
had defrauded you? 
A. What was that again? 
Q. Before you were contacted by the Attorney 
General's Office, did you feel like Ron Harry 
had done anything wrong? 
A. Yes. We found -- that all came about --
well, it started --it started right off the 
bat when I got the statement from Onaga Bank 
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that he did something he wasn't supposed to 
be doing. 
Q. But when you first got the statement from 
Onaga Bank, you didn't tell him to try to get 
out of it, did you? 
R. 442 A. Yeah, I did. 
Q. At that time you didn't realize that 
further contributions were required, did you? 
A. When he said it was a partnership, the 
word partnership just got my attention. I 
said, no partnerships, Ron. I said, I want 
to get out of this thing. He said, well, we 
can't. I said, well, why can't you? He 
said, well, because we can't get the money. 
I said, why not, it is in the bank down there 
in Onaga, why can't we just get it? He said, 
we can't do that because its not in Onaga. I 
said, where is it? He said, its in a 
partnership. We just kind of went around and 
around and around. 
* * * 
R. 443 Q. But as of June or July of 1988, weren't 
you starting to have some doubts as to 
whether Mr. Harry was doing what you were 
telling him to do or following your 
instructions? 
A. Yeah. But as time went on, yes. 
Q. On page --
A. Actually, I got concerned about my 
account. 
Q. Starting in June or July of 1988? 
R. 444 A. I don't know when it started. It just 
kind of evolved, you know. 
Q. Did it start when you found out that Ron 
Harry had bought this partnership in Red 
River Mountain? 
A. That was when it was a panic. 
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Q. Did you actually begin to have doubts 
about Mr. Harry before you found out Red 
River Mountain was a partnership? 
A. I don't remember the time frame of these 
doubts. It just kind of gradually grew and 
it just kind of evolved. But this is what 
really did it, when he went 180 degrees from 
the instructions he had from me. Ron Harry 
knew that he was not supposed to invest in 
any limited partnerships. He never had my 
permission, power of attorney, or proxy to 
sign my name on anything. 
Q. And you found out in June or July of 1988 
that Ron Harry violated this instruction and 
invested in a partnership, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The Red River Mountain Partnership, 
correct? 
(The witness is nodding his head in the 
affirmative.) Yes. 
R. 445 Q. On page thirteen of Exhibit E [Red River 
Pre-offering Summary], it has a limited 
partners contribution schedule. Do you 
understand what that is? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is it? 
A. It's the partnership required an annual 
contribution to the partnership. 
Q. If you would have read this pre-offering 
summary in June or July of 1988, when Ron 
Harry showed it to you, you would have known 
not only Red River Mountain was a 
partnership, but that it also called for 
annual contributions, correct? 
A. If I would have read it? 
Q. Correct. 
A. Yes. I wouldn't have got that far. As 
soon as he said the word partnership, that 
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would have killed it right there. I would 
not have invested in the partnership. 
Q. But he did tell you it was a partnership 
in June or July of 1988 and you didn't do any 
further investigation on your own? 
A. Yeah. I told him, I said, I told you no 
partnerships. I said, I want you to get us 
out of this. 
• * • 
R. 446 Q. Nevertheless, in June or July of 1988, 
you knew that Ron Harry had violated a very 
serious and express instruction from you not 
to invest these funds in a partnership, 
correct? 
A. Yes. Actually, we're talking about time 
frames here and its kind of hard to remember. 
He knew right off the bat. I mean, what day 
did you say in there that he -- that I knew 
he violated? 
Q. June and July of 1988, when you received 
the statement from First Bank of Onaga --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- and had the meeting with Ron Harry. 
At that time, in June or July of 1988, you 
were aware that Ron Harry violated a very 
serious and express instruction from you by 
investing in this Red River Mountain 
partnership? 
A. Yes . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, Isaacs testified at his deposition as follows: 
R. 453 Q. Did you tell Ron Harry [at the July 1988 
meeting] that you thought this [Red River] 
was not the kind of investment that you 
wanted to invest in? 
A. I mentioned that fact that I thought it 
was kind of shaky . . . 
• * * 
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R. 454 Q. Were you satisfied with Ron Harry's 
explanation after you left the [July 1988] 
meeting? 
A. Maybe pacified. 
Q. Were you mad at Ron Harry because he made 
this [Red River] investment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you tell him that you had not given 
him authority to make the investment in Red 
River? 
R. 455 A. No, I didn't use that wording. I just 
said I was concerned about making a $31/000 
investment on a quicky swap or deal, whatever 
you want to refer to it as. I was looking 
for something a little more substantial in 
the way investments went. 
Q. In July of 1988/ at the meeting/ did you 
tell Ron Harry that you were upset that he 
purchased this investment without getting 
approval from you beforehand? 
A. I guess I did/ yes. (Emphasis added.) 
As the above deposition testimony clearly establishes, 
Brgoch and Isaacs had actual notice in July 1988 of the exact 
conduct complained of in this action: Harry's unauthorized 
investment of plaintiffs' funds in a real estate limited 
partnership. Plaintiffs knew Harry had done something wrong by 
violating their express instructions not to invest in limited 
partnerships and implored him to "get them out." At that point 
the statute of limitations began to run. That plaintiffs did not 
decide to file a claim against Harry at this point did not 
prevent the statute of limitations from running: the period 
begins to run when the claimant knows of the facts constituting 
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the fraud, and this rule is not "altered by the plaintiff's 
ignorance of his legal rights." Gibson, supra, 48 Utah at 247. 
The only aspect of plaintiffs' claims which Harry allegedly 
did not reveal to them in July of 1988 was that Red River 
required annual contributions. However, this aspect of the 
investment clearly was not as important as the fact that Harry 
had caused them to invest in a real estate limited partnership: 
Q. Did it ever cross your mind that there might 
be an obligation for further contributions? 
A. Never. I didn't like it because it was 
partnership to start out, even before I found 
out there were assessments. 
[Supplemental Appellate Record, Brgoch Depo., p. 58.]6 
Moreover, as noted above, it is not necessary for a claimant to 
know every fact or detail about his fraud claim before the 
statute begins to run. Baldwin, supra, 850 P.2d at 1197. 
Rather, all that is required is 
knowledge of facts which would have put an ordinarily 
prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would 
have resulted in a discovery of fraud. [Id. at 1196 
(emphasis added).] 
Here, plaintiffs clearly were on inquiry notice after 
learning in July 1988 that their money had been invested in a 
real estate limited partnership without their authorization; they 
admitted they were extremely upset with Harry and demanded an 
explanation. But Harry did not attempt to conceal that he had 
6
 In addition, since plaintiffs did not pay any annual 
contributions, this aspect of the investment does not figure as a 
part of their claim for damages. Thus, it was not necessary for 
plaintiffs to be aware of this fact for the statute of limitations 
to begin running. 
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invested their funds in a real estate limited partnership 
contrary to their express inscruetions. Rather, he simply 
admitted that it was a real estate limited partnership. 
Plaintiffs could have easily learned that the Red River 
limited partnership required annual contributions; Brgoch 
admitted that Harry showed him the Red River pre-offering 
summary, which clearly lists the annual contribution requirement, 
but Brgoch did not attempt to read it, or investigate further. 
(See Brgoch Depo. testimony quoted, supra.) Instead, plaintiffs 
simply accepted Harry's explanation of the merits of the 
investment, even though he did not deny the accusations made 
against him. Moreover, plaintiffs did not attempt to contact 
anyone at Private Ledger, even though both clearly felt Harry had 
done something very wrong by investing their funds in Red River. 
An ordinarily prudent man would not have been so easily 
"pacified", in the words of Isaacs, but would have investigated 
further. Consequently, this lack of knowledge about this one 
last aspect of the Red River investment cannot prevent the 
commencement of the running of the statute of limitations in July 
of 1988. 
Likewise, plaintiffs did not contend before the trial court, 
and could not contend, that there was any delayed discovery of 
their alleged claims against Private Ledger. The only "fact" 
upon which plaintiffs base their purported claims against Private 
Ledger is that Harry was a registered representative of Private 
Ledger in May of 1988 when they made their investment in Red 
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River from their Kansas bank accounts. That fact was known to 
plaintiffs in May and July of 1988, and there was no subsequent 
discovery of any facts or evidence with respect to Private Ledger 
which would excuse the plaintiffs in waiting over three years to 
commence an action against Private Ledger. 
At the latest, the statute of limitations on plaintiffs' 
claims began to run in July 1988 and the three year statute of 
limitations expired in July 1991. Plaintiffs did not file their 
Complaint until approximately eight months later on March 17, 
1992. As a result, plaintiffs' claims are time barred. 
(2) Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause Of Action For Securities 
Violations Is Time Barred. 
In their sixth cause of action, plaintiffs alleged 
securities violations under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The 
statute of limitations for these claims is set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated section 61-1-22(7) (a) which provides that: 
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability 
under this section unless brought before the expiration 
of four years after the act or transaction constituting 
the violation or the expiration of two years after the 
discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting 
the violation, whichever expires first. (Emphasis 
added.) 
As set forth above, plaintiffs discovered the conduct they 
complain of in this action -- that Harry invested their funds in 
a real estate limited partnership in violation of their express 
instructions -- in July 1988. Therefore, the two year statute of 
limitations for any violations under the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act expired in July 1990. 
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Furthermore, plaintiffs learned of the only other aspect of 
their claim of which they were allegedly unaware in July of 
1988 -- that Red River required annual contributions -- when they 
received the letter from Red River dated March 15, 1989 demanding 
payment of their annual contribution of over $17,000. At that 
point, plaintiffs were fully aware of every fact constituting 
their claims, thus triggering the two-year statute of limitations 
for Utah securities claims. This period expired in March of 
1991, about one year before plaintiffs filed their claims in 
March of 1992. Therefore, all claims under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act are clearly barred by the statute of limitations. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The arguments made by plaintiffs on this appeal are directly 
contrary to this Court's rulings in State v. Harry, supra. This 
Court concluded that the evidence was clear, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Harry had defrauded Private Ledger by engaging in his 
"selling away" activities. The trial court here correctly 
analyzed the decision in State v. Harry and properly concluded 
that an agent could not be criminally defrauding the principal at 
the same time the agent was purportedly acting on the principal's 
behalf. 
The rule of law sought by plaintiffs in this appeal is 
contrary to all of the reported decisions on this specific issue, 
including two separate federal Court of Appeals decisions 
rendered in 1994, Hauser, supra, and Bates, supra. Moreover, the 
rule of law suggested by plaintiffs would wreak havoc with 
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established business relationships and subject any principal or 
employer to civil liability no matter how outrageous or criminal 
the conduct engaged in by the alleged agent. Nothing in this 
Court's decision in Horrocks, supra, supports the far-reaching 
rule urged by plaintiffs. 
For the reasons set forth in this Brief, Private Ledger 
respectfully submits that the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment and requests that this Court affirm the granting 
of summary judgment on both grounds presented to the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED: September 8, 1995 STRONG & HANNI 
By: 
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